Security concerns in South-Eastern Europe at the turn of millenium by Anton Bebler










Received in June 2002
At present no war is being fought in SEE. However this outward tranquility was imposedfrom
outside through energetic military interventions by the West, the establishment of international
military and security protectorates over parts of the region, as well as by stationing
peace-keeping troops, international police, armed and unarmed foreign observers at the
hottest trouble spots in SEE. The suppression of armed hostilities did not however add up to
real and durable peace. Thus security in the region still remains precarious. Security problems
of South-Eastern Europe have been by and large concentrated in or directly related to the area
called the Balkans. As mentioned earlier these two expressions are not synonymous.
South-Eastern Europe is a wider notion which was recently given by the Western powers a
curious political dimension supplementing its geographic content. The active involvement of
NATO and EU member states in SEE as well as the presence of international peace-keeping
forces will be necessary for, at least, a decade in order to prevent new outbursts of violence.
However the structures of two international protectorates cannot provide
for self-sustaining political and social stability in the area.
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1. Introduction
South-Eastern Europe (SEE) has during the last
two centuries well merited the distinction as the most
volatile and troublesome part of the European conti-
nent. Uprisings, revolutions, guerrilla warfare, mass
extermination or expulsion of population, banditry,
terrorism and other forms of violence, local warfare
and coalition wars with continental implications have
punctured the periods of relative peace at almost regu-
lar intervals from 1804 on. In the twentieth century
only wars and other large-scale military operations
took place in 1912-1913, 1914-1918, 1934-1938,
1941-1945,1947-1948,1956, 1975 and 1991-1995.
SEE became again a scene of bloody violence at the
turn of the 20th century in 1999. The quick deterio-
ration of the security situation in the region followed
and was largely triggered by otherwise positive de-
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velopments - by the end of the Cold War, by the break-
down of most authoritarian communist-dominated
regimes, the transition to democratic political systems
and market economies.
At present no war is being fought in SEE. How-
ever this outward tranquillity was imposed from out-
side through energetic military interventions by the
West, the establishment of international military and
security protectorates over parts of the region, as well
as by stationing peace-keeping troops, international
police, armed and unarmed foreign observers at the
hottest trouble spots in SEE. The suppression of
armed hostilities did not however add up to real and
durable peace. Thus security in the region still re-
mains precarious.
The overall situation in this part of Europe at
the turn of the millennium could be described as a
combination of long-standing sources of tensions and
conflicts with the consequences of the dynamic
change, which has shaken the region since the late
1980s.
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On the positive side it included:
The greatly reduced or perhaps altogether re-
moved threat of nuclear, chemical or biological con-
flagration and also of large-scale interstate conven-
tional warfare in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe;
Very considerable to drastic reductions of mil i-
tary power in most states of the region (manpower
under arms, inventories of heavy weapons, defence
allocations, military industrial production, trade in
weapons, etc.);
Progress in settling a number of conflict issues
in the region related to contested borders, national,
ethnic and religious minorities;
Increased participation by the states from the
region in cooperative and peacekeeping activities both
in SEE and elsewhere in the world.
On the other hand the tectonic geopolitical shift
since the late 1980s brought on its wings a number of
clearly negative phenomena:
The upsurge of nationalism, xenophobia, in-
tolerance as well as the reappearance of previously
suppressed cleavages and conflicts;
Several breakouts of mass armed violence;
massive repression, persecution and expulsion of na-
tional, ethnic and religious minorities; the flight of
several million refugees and displaced persons; mas-
sive destruction of housing, economic assets, cultural
monuments, public facilities, etc.;
Disruptions in economic activities and move-
ment of persons and goods caused by armed conflicts;
considerable to drastic drops in the level of industrial
production, intra-regional trade, GNPs and GNP p.c.,
sharp increases in unemployment and also poverty
due to systemic changes, breakdown of the previously
existing patterns of economic cooperation;
The intensification of several varieties of non-
military threats to national and regional security (cor-
ruption, organised crime, illegal trafficking of arms,
drugs, human beings, etc.).
There have also been important changes in the
geopolitical make-up of the region. These followed
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and of two
multinational "socialist federations" the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the USSR. As
the result the total number of internationally recog-
nised states and of unrecognised separate para-state
entities has more than doubled. Instead of seven pre-
viously existing states (two NATO members, three
WTO members and two non-aligned/isolated states)
we observe today twelve recognised states and at least
four other entities with different status. Smaller enti-
ties which resulted from the breakdown oflarger states
are by and large less heterogeneous than the preced-
ing states from the ethnic, religious and national view-
points. The potential for further political fragmenta-
tion in the region has not however been exhausted, in
spite of the clearly negative attitude towards it dis-
played by major powers and international organiza-
tions. The number of real or potential conflict pairs
of states has substantially increased and even more
so the multitude of intrastate sources of conflicts. All
this has more than compensated for a decrease in the
previously existing conflict potential between states
belonging to different and competing political-ideo-
logical orders and to two military-political blocs.
South-Eastern Europe has thus proved to be much
more unstable and sensitive to the shifts in relations
between major powers than the northern half of former
Eastern Europe. In this and in some other respects
SEE has been similar or analogous in the make-up to
the geopolitical fault-line stretching from Turkey all
the way to China. Z. Brzezinski called this belt of
instability the "Asian Balkans".
Having been for many centuries divided be-
tween several empires SEE has never become a co-
herent and viable region in cultural, economic or po-
litical sense. Even its geographic delimitation remains
contestable. In fact the presumably politically neu-
tral term "South-Eastern Europe" came into use in
contemporary diplomacy as an imperfect substitute
and euphemism for another notion, which became
negatively value-laden in the last century. Which
states belong to South-Eastern Europe and which to
its most problematic core called the Balkans is a de-
batable proposition, particularly as far as its Western
and Northern rims are concerned. Hungary, Slovenia
and Croatia have displayed in the past reticence to
being included into South-Eastern Europe, while
Romania and Moldova did not. Slovenia, Hungary,
Romania and Moldova represent the Northern limits
of the region. To the South and to the Southeast the
region encompasses the European part of Turkey, the
continental and insular parts of Greece, and logically
ought to include also Cyprus.
3. The specificity of the Balkans
Security problems of South-Eastern Europe
have been by and large concentrated in or directly
related to the area called the Balkans. As mentioned
earlier these two expressions are not synonymous.
South-Eastern Europe is a wider notion which was
recently given by the Western powers a curious po-
litical dimension supplementing its geographic con-
tent. In fact from a purely geographic stand-point SEE
ought to have encompassed also Ukraine and the
South-European part of the Russian Federation lying
between Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Caucasus.
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However the West preferred to keep both Ukraine
and Russia in a different category of states.
Since it was used for the first time, about three
centuries ago, the concept of the Balkans, on the other
hand, has had a specific substantive political and cul-
tural meaning. Its inventors were German geographers
who used the Turkish word "Balkan" (mountain) to
designate the European possessions of the Ottoman
Empire. Since then the term "Balkans" has been closely
related to the political and cultural imprint left by about
five centuries of the Turkish rule in the area of the
Southeast of the Austrian Empire of eighteen century.
Historically an area of invasions, contests of extra-re-
gional powers and of massive migrations the Balkans
have as a result become a living ethnographic museum
of a sort. For several centuries already they have been
the most heterogeneous part of the European conti-
nent per square mile in ethnic, religious and recently
also in national terms.Thus the inhabitants did not have
a common indigenous name for the area and later ac-
cepted the German invention, although it was based
on a geographic misconception. The lack of a regional
focus and of cohesion contributed greatly to conflicts
among ethnic, religious and national groups, between
regional powers, para-states and newly founded states
once the process of decolonisation (and partial democ-
ratisation) reached the Balkans in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. These intermittent clashes as-
sured for the Balkans the well-earned reputation of a
(or the) European "powder keg". The Balkans' inter-
nal weakness and incoherence as well as continuous
squabbles among its rulers made the region in the twen-
tieth century also an easy prey for extra-regional im-
perial and expansionist powers - Austria-Hungary,
Russia, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union.
The end of the East-West confrontation in the
last decade of the twentieth century brought about a
geopolitical shift of seminal proportion. With the de-
mise of the Warsaw Pact the Balkans have ceased to
be an object of sharp contests for political and military
control or domination by external imperial powers. The
area lost its previously considerable geostrategic im-
portance. As it also lacks extraordinary mineral, en-
ergy or other resources crucial for the world economy
it is likely that the risk of conflicts, over the Balkans
have been greatly reduced or eliminated altogether. This
state of affairs is likely to persist for at least several
decades to come. On the other hand the interest of big
powers, compared with the Cold War has gone down
as well. The West's primary motivation became to con-
tain, manage and, if need be, directly or indirectly con-
trol the geographically closest sources of instability
threatening the EU area and also the cohesion in the
Euro-Atlantic community.
The post-Cold War movements on the world
scene have generally diminished tangible extra-regional
military threats to South-Eastern Europe. On the other
hand future conflicts outside the region (e. g. in the CIS
area, around the Caspian Sea and in the Near East) might
well indirectly affect the Balkan security as well. More-
over the proliferation of capabilities for producing chemi-
cal weapons and middle-range missiles has already
reached the Near East and North Africa. This particular
combination of military capabilities could in the future
become a dangerous instrument of threats and black-
mail related also to SEE. Furthermore the level of non-
military threats from outside the region has increased
dramatically. Technological developments and the proc-
esses of globalisation have exposed South-Eastern Eu-
rope to new risks of social and ecological instability.
The dramatic change, wars and other develop-
ments since the late 1980s have caused huge economic
dislocation and damage to the region. They wiped
out the result of many years and in some areas up to
three decades of the preceding progress. Consider-
able, even dramatic drops in industrial (and to a lesser
extent also in agricultural) production and in GNP in
some countries have increased disparities between the
most and the least prosperous areas within SEE. To-
day Greece, Slovenia and Cyprus constitute the up-
per crust in terms of GNP per capita, while the FRY
(Serbia and Montenegro) and Albania are at the bot-
tom. The differences in average pay and in the level
of unemployment inside the region have become ten-
fold or even higher. Such disparities across the bor-
ders in the same region inevitably feed social insta-
bility and political unrest particularly if they are mag-
nified by modern mass media as well as manipulated
and exploited by ruthless politicians. The traumatic
history of the region serves as a powerful tool of mass
mobilization behind nationalist, religious and xeno-
phobic slogans. Deep economic and social roots of
political instability also contribute to the continua-
tion of the negative features in the Balkans' past.
The potential for unleashing armed violence and
exploiting it for political purposes has been reflected
in the quantity and quality of stocks of arms and am-
munition, of domestic arms production and arms im-
ports to SEE from other regions. The overall level of
armament in the inventories of the armed forces has
appreciably decreased since 1990 partly due to the
application of the conventional arms agreement (CFE).
This compact however covered only the members of
NATO and of the Warsaw Pact. In addition the Dayton-
Paris agreement imposed limitations on inventories of
heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FRY and
Croatia. A more important reason for the downslide
was the reduction in defence appropriation and in the
size of armed forces due to severe economic strains
and political change in former communist-dominated
states. Furthermore large quantities of heavy weapons
became obsolete due to the dismantling of the Warsaw
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Pact and to greatly reduced domestic production of
relatively advanced weapons systems. An appreciable
increase in domestic arms production seems to have
been recorded only in Turkey.
4. Varieties of existing
security concerns
in South-Eastern Europe
Intra-regional security concerns in SEE have
been reviewed by a number of authors and catego-
rised by them according to criteria such as history,
geography, the types and mixtures of conflict issues
at stake, etc. Jeffrey Simon, for example, divided "the
roots of Balkan insecurity and instability" into four
groups: (1) psychological factors; (2) state-building
challenges; (3) economic development issues and (4)
security/defence issues. As conceivable armed con-
flicts in the region will be reviewed in another paper
I shall concentrate on security concerns with only
indirect or without obvious military implications.
They could be classified as follows:
I. Still unresolved disputes among SEE states
over parts of the borders, their delimitation and mark-
ing, minority issues, various aspects of succession of
ex-Yugoslavia, access to international waters and wa-
terways, transit rights, etc.
2. Dangerous leftovers of the past military con-
flicts in the Balkans such as several million
unexploded anti-personnel mines, large illegal stocks
of small arms and explosives, etc.
3. At least two million refugees, displaced per-
sons or other migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia proper, Cyprus, etc. who still
cannot return to their homes.
4. Social and political unrest caused by poverty,
high unemployment, shortages of essential goods, by
the lack of housing, corruption, etc. in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia proper, Albania and in
some other former communist-ruled Balkan states.
5. Conceivable inter-communal clashes in
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia,
Moldova and elsewhere.
6. Posible political protests, demonstrations and
clashes with security or peacekeeping forces in Ser-
bia proper, in Kosovo and in Republic of Srpska
(Bosnia- Herzegovina).
7. Political tensions caused by minority griev-
ances and by the demands for a higher collective sta-
tus (regional autonomy, enhanced autonomy, federal
or confederal status).
8. Terrorism, organised crime, illegal trade in
drugs and arms.
9. Organised mass smuggling of workers, chil-
dren, prostitutes and human organs from Asia and
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Africa into Western Europe (with the FRY and
Bosnia-Herzegovina as the main gateways).
10. Transboundary pollution and ecological
disasters (like the cyanide poisoning in a Danube
tributary caused by an Australian-owned gold mine
in Romania).
This list, by no means exhaustive, demonstrates
the diversity and gravity of numerous social, eco-
nomic, political, cultural-religions and ecological
problems threatening the stability in South-Eastern
Europe. The overall preponderance of non-military
threats to security during the past decade has been a
common feature in the entire formerly communist-
dominated Eastern Europe. In its Southern part nev-
ertheless this preponderance has been less pronounced
and was at times overshadowed in the public mind
and mass media by dramatic war events.
Moreover many non-military threats feed and
stimulate political tensions and conflicts with possi-
ble military implications. It stands to reason then that
the attaining durable and self-sustaining stability re-
quires cardinal improvements in socio-economic con-
ditions in SEE. As one of the least prosperous re-
gions in Europe (in addition recently afflicted by
armed violence and resulting human losses and de-
struction) South-Eastern Europe lacks the material,
technical and human resources to deal effectively with
this seminal challenge. Even more damaging is the
inability, insufficient willingness or outright unwill-
ingness of the elites to cooperate across state borders
in overcoming these difficulties. There are various
historical, psychological and other reasons to explain
this lack of a culture of regional cooperation. This
peculiar feature sets South-Eastern Europe apart from
most other European regions (e.g. Scandinavia). The
SEE elites, with a few exceptions, have instead his-
torically tended to align themselves with and look
for support from major powers outside the region.
The still present reticence to cooperate even with
neighbouring states requires from the international
community (essentially the West) to provide not only
economic and technical assistance as inducement for
cooperation but also to actively exert political pres-
sure on recalcitrant parties in the region.
5. The experience of
the international community
in dealing with insecurity
in South-Eastern Europe
Since, at least, 1919 there have been several
attempts by SEE states to deal collectively with com-
mon security threats. With a few and only temporary
exceptions these attempts have been largely unsuc-
cessful. The extension of the Cold War polarisation
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to SEE and of the two originally extra-regional mili-
tary alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact) has imposed
on their members constraints of bloc discipline and
pushed under the surface numerous intra-regional
conflicts. The geopolitical highly sensitive and promi-
nent position of the SFR of Yugoslavia between the
two blocs also contributed to putting a lid on internal
conflicts in that multinational and multi-confessional
state. The result was a relative calm and stability,
which persisted in the Balkans until the end of the
East- West confrontation.
Consequently the outbursts of violence and
destruction, particularly on the territory of ex- Yugo-
slavia came as a great surprise to the international
public, to most decision- makers in the West and also
to the movement of non-aligned (in which Tito's Yu-
goslavia gained a respectable and influential position).
By then the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were
themselves in the process of disintegration, while
China was too distant and already without its former
Balkan client Albania. It wisely chose not to be em-
broiled. The Third World remained beset with its own
problems and also divisions and quarrels. All this left
the Western powers as the only important actors ca-
pable of influencing the dynamics of conflicts in the
region and also projecting military power onto it if
needed be. The West's potency was however greatly
reduced by erroneous assessments and wrong pre-
scriptions as well as by disagreements and frictions
among Western powers. The West generally reacted
slowly and displayed only secondary, reflective con-
cern for the region, as it primarily feared SEE's
domino effect on USSR's breakdown. USA used then
diplomatic pressures, admonitions and warnings and
essentially left the room for a stronger action to their
Western European allies. The latter tried also diplo-
matic pressures, coupled however with financial in-
ducements, promises of membership in EEC and ex-
plicit threats of economic sanctions. As a rule at every
turn of the quickly developing situation the West's
actions were late and ineffective. At the time when a
brief but robust demonstration of Western military
power might have prevented the outbreaks of armed
violence in the Balkans there came none. As military
clashes started spreading in Croatia the West Euro-
peans tried mediation and sent for the first time in
EEC history unarmed observers for the crisis area.
Neither instrument prevented the violence from
spreading. Unable to agree among themselves on the
best course of action the Western powers asked the
UN (and CSCE) to introduce international
peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations as well
as to apply sanctions. The West tried essentially, at a
low cost to itself, to contain the area of conflict. It let
the unruly Yugoslavs "to boil in their own stew" in
the hope that the armed conflicts and violence would
by themselves come to a halt through exhaustion of
the parties involved.
This strategy did not work either. Although the
feared spread of armed conflicts into neighbouring
states and into the CIS area did not occur it proved to
be impossible to stop the spill over of other negative
consequences (refugees, displaced persons, losses in
trade, disruptions in communications and flows of
goods, persons, services, etc.). The UN peacekeep-
ing force (UNPROFOR) could not possibly accom-
plish its primary mission, as there was no peace to
keep. In addition the force was wrong-footed from
the beginning having been based on the inappropri-
ate notion of impartiality towards the warring par-
ties. It was also only lightly armed on the basis of an
obsolete doctrine of peacekeeping. Furthermore the
UN General Assembly did not provide for adequate
military and financial means. The UNPROFOR ca-
pabilities were clearly insufficient for carrying out
the mandate, which underwent numerous modifica-
tions by the Security Council. The growing political
disagreements and tensions among Western powers,
related to the Balkans, had also burdened Euro-At-
lantic relations. Eventually the West realised that the
accumulated direct and indirect financial and politi-
cal burdens of containment considerably exceeded
the probable costs of an energetic military peace-im-
posing intervention. The brief air and land operations
were conducted against the Bosnian Serbs in 1994
and summer 1995. Combined with Croatia's military
campaign indeed it stopped warfare in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and paved the way to the Dayton-Paris
peace agreement. The inappropriate analogy with this
successful military operation has led however to faulty
calculations and a number of serious mistakes prior
to and during NATO's next operation in the Balkans
in March-June 1999. The Western record in dealing
with the Balkans in 1990s could be summarized as a
chequered experience of learning by trial and error.
A complimentary venue of international action
was manifested in efforts to induce and infuse eco-
nomic, political and security cooperation with and in
SEE. All these efforts were initiated and brought in
from outside the region. Among them one should
mention the web of cooperation, customs union and
association agreements with EU, the Central Euro-
pean Initiative (CEI), CEFTA, SECr, NATO's "Part-
nership for Peace" program et al. None of these
schemes proved to be simultaneously universal (re-
gion-wide) and effective. The further enlargement of
NATO into SEE (with the admission of Hungary in
1999) and the enlargement of the EU (possibly around
2004-2005) have so far reduced neither the number
nor the intensity of security concerns in the region.
Soon after the termination of hostilities with
the FRY and the implantation of an international
128 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Selected bibliography:
peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) a new and
ambitious tool was created for dealing with SEE's
long-term problems. On July 30, 1999 the partici-
pants of an international summit in Sarajevo signed
the "Stability Pact for South East Europe". The Pact
was designed to "promote political and economic re-
forms, development and enhanced security". West-
ern powers, primarily EU, committed considerable
funds to the fulfilment of these ambitious goals. (How-
ever the total sum of projected disbursement for the
next five years cannot be compared with the magni-
tude of the Marshall Plan and is several times lower
than the value of Western assistance to Tito's Yugo-
slavia between 1949 and 1995). Their implementa-
tion has been also too slow and burdened with exces-
sive bureaucratic red tape.
A novel development manifested itself in the
creation in January 1999 of a Balkan rapid reaction
capability called "South-Eastern Europe Multi-Na-
tional Force" (SEEMNF). Participant states repre-
sented in the force are Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy,
Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Force headquar-
ters until 2003 is Plovdiv (Bulgaria). This project, if
successful, will help to dampen the edges separating
the ATO and EU members from non-members and
to develop the lacking culture of regional security
cooperation.
The international record of dealing with the
sources of instability and insecurity in SEE has high-
lighted the importance of:
Clear understanding and realistic appreciation
of the complexity of security problems in the Bal-
kans, which defy quick one-dimensional solutions;
The previously underestimated interconnection
between the security in SEE and security in other parts
of the continent;
Great advantages of energetic preventive mili-
tary demonstrations and deployments;
A robust and well-coordinated international
action to improve the economic and social situation
in SEE, to develop its infrastructure, to facilitate and
encourage cooperation among the countries of the
region;
Extending the webs of Western-based integra-
tions and their cooperative programmes into the re-
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gion (EU, NATO, PfP) as well as strengthening in-
ternational organizations and other instruments for
economic and political cooperation in and for the re-
gion (Stability Pact, CEFTA, Black See Cooperation
Council, etc.);
The need for a rational division of labour and
effective coordination of activities between numer-
ous international organisations operating in and/or
dealing with the region (OUN, OSCE, NATO, EU,
UNHCR, IBRD, etc.).
Learning from the lessons of the past decade
and acting accordingly could improve the interna-
tional community's ability to manage security prob-
lems in Europe's still most volatile region.
The chief conclusion of this review is that ac-
tive involvement of NATO and EU member states in
SEE as well as the presence of international peace-
keeping forces will be necessary for, at least, a dec-
ade in order to prevent new outbursts of violence.
However the structures of two international military/
police/civilian protectorates cannot provide for self-
sustaining political and social stability in the area.
The Dayton agreements and the LTN Security Coun-
cil resolution no. 1244 are based on two legal fic-
tions - the existence of a single state in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the FRY sovereignty on Kosovo.
Furthermore the Dayton agreement imposed on
Bosnia-Herzegovina a political system whose corner-
stone is separate national/religious representation and
institutions of three largest communities in their re-
spective majority areas. These provisions run coun-
ter the basic democratic principle of equal rights of
all citizens before the law and against the stated prin-
ciples and objectives of the international community.
The existing arrangements have in fact solidified na-
tional/religious separation in spite of the commend-
able efforts of resettling and protecting minority refu-
gees. A very similar and even more drastic spatial
separation has occurred in Kosovo since the armed
conflict in 1999. The objective of both cases, which
is creating multiethnic, multireligious and
multicultural societies, is simply unattainable but still
remains the official dogma or pretence of the West.
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